(individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the signaling game is limited by the … average level of credibility for its good ratings than in individual rating. In decentralized rating, the ratings are again … degree of rating inflation and hence a greater level of credibility than in individual rating. Comparing centralized rating …

(individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the signaling game is limited by the … average level of credibility for its good ratings than in individual rating. In decentralized rating, the ratings are again … degree of rating inflation and hence a greater level of credibility than in individual rating. Comparing centralized rating …

current policy choice. Deviating from (exogenous) traditional party policy reduces the credibility of a party in the eyes of … voters of both parties. They get either desensitised or over-sensitised in respect to party credibility which alters the …

youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing …-based mechanisms are fragile, since punishment is a more compelling signaling device (in a sense that we make precise). …

In signaling environments ranging from consumption to education, high quality senders often shun the standard signals …

current policy choice. Deviating from (exogenous) traditional party policy reduces the credibility of a party in the eyes of … voters of both parties. They get either desensitised or over-sensitised in respect to party credibility which alters the …