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On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty

Penta, Antonio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 2, pp. 405-430

for some arbitrarily close type. Hence, refinements of rationalizability are not robust. This negative result is obtained … rationalizability when arbitrary common knowledge assumptions are relaxed (i.e., without assuming richness). For arbitrary spaces of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686699

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030

On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty

Penta, Antonio - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 2, pp. 405-430

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599487

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946259

Rationalization and Incomplete Information

Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Siniscalchi, Marciano - In: Advances in Theoretical Economics 3 (2003) 1

on first-order beliefs. For any fixed D we obtain a solution called D-rationalizability.In static games, D-rationalizability … capturing the robust implications of Bayesian equilibrium analysis.In dynamic games, D-rationalizability yields a forward …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014588989

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND ROBUSTNESS IN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS

Penta, Antonio - 2010

equilibria can be computed by means of a "backwards procedure" that combines the logic of rationalizability and backward …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009438697

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215306

Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors

Maor, Cy; Solan, Eilon - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 44 (2015) 2, pp. 321-346

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378475

On the beliefs off the path : equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k

Breitmoser, Yves; Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Zizzo, Daniel John - In: Games and economic behavior 86 (2014), pp. 102-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304989