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Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752557
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690929
In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality (Perea [1]) and extensive form rationalizability (Pearce [2], Battigalli [3], Battigalli...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682976
We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282459
Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving first. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366444
The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008301
We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772157
The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005694999
The paper deals with the driving forces behind behavior selection in both forward induction refinements and discrete evolutionary processes with mutations. Its main purpose is to analyse an important difference due to the support of the mutations. It shows that similar driving forces can allow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169519
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264436