We study a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability: that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the...

We study a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability: that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the...

Charles Darwin (1874) stated that women are less selfish but men are more competitive. Very recent papers (Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001 or Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, among others) have shown the relevance of gender in altruism in both ultimatum and dictator games. In this paper we analyze the...

Charles Darwin (1874) stated that "women are less selfish but men are more competitive". Very recent papers (Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001 or Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, among others) have shown the relevance of gender in altruism in both ultimatum and dictator games. In this paper we analyze...

Charles Darwin (1874) stated that "women are less selfish but men are more competitive". Very recent papers (Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001 or Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, among others) have shown the relevance of gender in altruism in both ultimatum and dictator games. In this paper we analyze...

A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten's (1983) (selten1983evolutionary) notion of limit ESS. We demonstrate that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the...

A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These...

The paper tests experimentally for limited foresight in sequential games. We develop a general out-of-equilibrium framework of strategic thinking based on limited foresight. It assumes the players take decisions focusing on close-by nodes, following backward induction – what we call limited...