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Communication and influence
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Martí, Joan de; Prat, Andrea - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 649-692
invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full … that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673298
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Communication and influence
Prat, Andrea; de Martí, Joan; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full … that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019200
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Communication and influence
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Martí, Joan de; Prat, Andrea - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 649-690
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346882
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Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning
Benabou, Roland; Falk, Armin; Tirole, Jean - 2018
compete with imperatives (general moral rules or precepts) as alternative modes of communication to persuade agents to behave …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931630
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Narratives, imperatives, and moral reasoning
Bénabou, Roland; Falk, Armin; Tirole, Jean - 2018
compete with imperatives (general moral rules or precepts) as alternative modes of communication to persuade agents to behave …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881454
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Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 67-101
when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public …. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible then public information can only be replicated … without explicit communication or with cheap talk communication only. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599535
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Naïve Learning in Social Networks with Random Communication
Heidergott, Bernd - 2018
We study social learning in a social network setting where agents receive independent noisy signals about the truth. Agents naïvely update beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The weights are fixed in the sense of representing average frequency and intensity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926326
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Strategic Diffusion in Communication Networks
Chakrabarti, Shomak - 2019
each other through links in a social network. The designer relies on this word-of-mouth communication channel to diffuse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870478
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Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Wolitzky, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 67-101
when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public …. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible then public information can only be replicated … without explicit communication or with cheap talk communication only. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674012
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Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295
) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319