Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient … allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex … post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the …

In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more … encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition …

mirrors real construction procurement auctions, our laboratory experiment tests the impact of the precision of a bidder’s cost …As procurement auctions increasingly move to digital platforms, more data and information is available (or can be made … estimate and the degree to which bidders know the inherent cost estimate precisions in the auction. We find that more …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …