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When supervisors have imperfect information about the soundness of banks, they may be unaware of insolvency problems that develop in the interval between on-site examinations. Supervising banks more often will alleviate this problem but will increase the costs of supervision. This paper analyzes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014187928
In the modern theory of finance, the valuation of derivative assets is commonly based on a replication argument. When there are transaction costs, this argument is no longer valid. In this paper, we try to address the general problem of finding the optimal portfolio among those which dominate a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521950
The paper presents a one-factor affine model of the term structure of Libor rates with autocorrelated measurement errors. It can be viewed as a central tendency model, with the theoretical arbitrage-free rates serving as stochastic means to which the observed rates revert. Two estimation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005127733
Researchers have sometimes argued that the recent ascent in stock prices could be explained in some measure by changes in expectations about long-run future dividend growth. For example, Barsky and De Long (1993) argue that a small random walk component in the growth rate of dividends, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005127767
When supervisors have imperfect information about the soundness of banks, they may be unaware of insolvency problems that develop in the interval between on-site examinations. Supervising banks more often will alleviate this problem but will increase the costs of supervision. This paper analyzes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005650370
The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian “contagion.” Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051604
In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard introduced by Pagès (J. Financ. Intermed. doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2012.06.001, 2012), with optimal contracting between competitive investors and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073244