only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common … expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations …

only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common … expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations …

only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner’s curse arises only in common values … expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations …

observations only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common … expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations …

unobserved auction heterogeneity of an arbitrary form. We develop a Hill (1975)-type tail index estimator and find the presence …

In this paper we propose a two-step semiparametric procedure to estimate first-price auction models. In the first … accommodate multiple auction covariates. Monte Carlo exercises show that the estimator performs well both in estimating the value …

auction data can be learned without restrictions beyond those derived from the relevant economic model. This enables us to … take a nonparametric perspective in discussing how the structure of auction models can be combined with observables to … uncover (or test hypotheses about) primitives of interest in auction markets. We focus on first-price sealed-bid and ascending …