The existing superstar model (Rosen 1981) does not require imperfect substitutes and explains the convexity of total earnings with respect to talent due to higher output for those with the most talent. We develop a model that explains why per unit earnings (wages or prices) would increase at an...

It has been argued the draft may enable the military to attract more able individuals than a volunteer military and thus increase welfare. We find this may be the case if a volunteer military simply takes the least able individuals. Ignoring the deadweight loss from taxation, when the military...

We consider the possibility a draft increases the likelihood individuals will invest in human capital in the military. This possibility exists because those drafted have less time to reap the return from human capital investment. A draft is more likely to increase human capital investment in the...

Oyer (2007, 2008) considered the turnover of economics professors early in their careers. He found professors are more likely to move down from higher ranked schools than up from lower ranked schools. An asymmetric information model suggests this phenomenon is explained by imperfect screening at...

Spence (1974a) considered a variant of his signaling model in which there are two types of jobs, and in which signaling can increase wealth by improving the allocation of individuals to jobs. Using results in signaling games since Spence’s work---the Riley outcome (Riley, 1979), the intuitive...

Oyer (2007, 2008) considered the turnover of economics professors early in their careers. He found professors are more likely to move down from higher ranked schools than up from lower ranked schools. An asymmetric information model suggests this phenomenon is explained by imperfect screening at...

Maybe. Lemon’s and signaling models generally deal with different welfare problems, the former with withdrawal of high quality sellers, and the latter with socially wasteful signals. However, with asymmetric information, high productivity workers may not (absent signaling) be employed where...