The main insight of this paper is that moral behavior does not necessarily alleviate coordination problems or may even worsen them, if individuals possess different degrees of morality. We characterize heterogenous Alger-Weibull morality preferences in a canonical model of voluntary...

This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories' threat to embargo (potential) free...

This paper analyzes international environmental agreements (IEAs) in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories’ choice of partial cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, full...

A numerical example employing a class of increasing absolute risk averse utility functions, the incomplete Euler gamma functions, proves that the slope of indifference curves in the $\mu,\sigma$)-space can be locally decreasing in $\sigma$ (for given $\mu$). So far, this possibility has been...

This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto...