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Your loss is my gain : a recruitment experiment with framed incnetives
De Quidt, Jonathan - 2017
find evidence for the predicted distaste for penalty contracts. In four experiments penalty framing actually increased the … job offer acceptance rate relative to bonus framing. I rule out a number of explanations, most notably self …-commitment motives do not seem to explain the finding. Two experiments that manipulate salience are successful at eliminating the effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602519
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Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment With Framed Incentives
Quidt, Jonathan de - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics … - 2014
penalties are infrequently used in practice. The most obvious explanation is selection: loss averse agents are unwilling to … 25 percent more likely to accept penalty contracts, with no evidence of adverse or advantageous selection. Consistent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010755996
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282296
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How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371874
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Your loss is my gain: a recruitment experiment with framed incentives
de Quidt, Jonathan - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014
penalties are infrequently used in practice. The most obvious explanation is selection: loss averse agents are unwilling to … 25 percent more likely to accept penalty contracts, with no evidence of adverse or advantageous selection. Consistent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126188
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Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333816
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A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333896
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Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427633
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A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427648
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Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316921