Similar Search Results

Law enforcement, social control and organized crime : evidence from local government dismissals in Italy

Cingano, Federico; Tonello, Marco - 2020

Local governments suspected of Mafia infiltration can be dismissed in Italy through an administrative act not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012156966

Anti-mafia law enforcement and lending in mafia lands : evidence from judicial administration in Italy

Calamunci, Francesca M.; De Benedetto, Marco Alberto; … - In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy 21 (2021) 3, pp. 1067-1106

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012612705

Fines, leniency and rewards in antitrust : an experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003880040

Fines, leniency, and REWARDS in antitrust

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - In: The Rand journal of economics 43 (2012) 2, pp. 368-390

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009618548

Law enforcement, social control and organized crime : evidence from local government dismissals in Italy

Cingano, Federico; Tonello, Marco - In: Italian economic journal : official peer-reviewed … 6 (2020) 2, pp. 221-254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012293056

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust : An Experiment

Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Bigoni, Maria; Le Coq, Chloe; … - 2011

This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186826