market efficiency in a setting in which experts need to invest in costly but unobservable effort to identify consumer … problems and consumers are able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis. We introduce heterogeneously-qualified experts …, varying in their necessary effort to diagnose consumers. We examine how subjects react to expert qualification and the …

unobservable effort to identify consumer problems. Experts have either high or low qualification and can invest either high or low …We investigate a market in which experts have a moral hazard problem because they need to invest in costly but … effort in their diagnosis. High skilled experts are able to identify problems with some probability even with low effort …

Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … laboratory experiment, we show that consumers are generally reluctant to accept expensive treatment recommendations, which is …

between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as … behavior of experts, however, is not significantly influenced by the health care framing, nor by the subject pool. …

experience. In a laboratory experiment we show that, against our theoretical predictions, this does not lead to a drop in experts …Markets for credence goods are classified by experts alone being able to identify consumers' problems and determine … appropriate services for solution. Examining a market where experts have to invest in costly diagnosis to correctly identify …

to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert’s … provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert’s promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most …

broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most … experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices …

broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most … experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices … increase the commitment value of proper promises. -- promises ; guilt, trust ; credence goods ; experts ; reciprocity …

Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … laboratory experiment, we show that consumers are generally reluctant to accept expensive treatment recommendations, which is …