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Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
Bolle, Friedel - 2017
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive … or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique … pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011629791
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Revenue Equivalence of the Volunteer’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds
Bolle, Friedel - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
The launch of a public project requires “enough” support from a group of n players. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). In this paper we keep the individual cost/benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212928
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Informative voting and the Samuelson rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006
for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374864
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Contests over public goods : evolutionary stability and the free-rider problem
Leininger, Wolfgang - 2002
We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409788
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Public Finance Without Taxation : Free-Riding as Institutional Artifact
Wagner, Richard E. - 2013
Expositions of the theory of public finance mostly wrongly assume that taxation is necessary to finance public goods. Taxation isn't necessary to finance public goods because free riding is an institutional artifact of the analytical dichotomy between public and private goods, which prevents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085687
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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix J. - 2006
for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732843
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Privatization, Free Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying : Additional Materials
Volokh, Alexander - 2015
This document, first created in 2007 and last updated in 2010, has now been superseded by the technical discussion in my 2010 article, Privatization, Free Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying, in the International Review of Law and Economics and the plain-English discussion in my 2008...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033332
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Contests Over Public Goods : Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem
Leininger, Wolfgang - 2021
We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320518
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Playing with other people's money: Contributions to public goods by trustees
Makowsky, Michael D.; Orman, Wafa Hakim; Peart, Sandra J. - In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics … 53 (2014) C, pp. 44-55
Decisions about public goods in the real world are frequently made by trustees—individuals responsible for managing pools of contributed funds—rather than by the contributors themselves. We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare contributions made by trustees who play with other trustees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220542
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Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem
Bierbrauer, Felix J. - 2006
This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule, which takes not only the marginal costs of public funds into account but also the desirability of preference revelation. Under a linear income tax more able individuals suffer from a larger utility loss if taxes are raised to cover the cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059394