Similar Search Results

Non-discriminatory electoral rules, local public goods, and redistribution : evidence from US municipalities

Elias, Ferran - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010416960

The political economy of housing prices : hedonic pricing with regression discontinuity

Sue, Eddie D. W.; Wong, Wei-kang - In: Journal of housing economics 19 (2010) 2, pp. 145-156

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300133

Love Thy (Elected) Neighbor? Residential Segregation, Political Representation and Local Public Goods

Harjunen, Oskari; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Tukiainen, Janne - 2021

jurisdictions using geo-coded data on politicians, the electorate and elementary schools. Descriptive analysis reveals that poorer … neighborhoods are under-represented and that local politicians have a strong support base in their home neighbourhoods. Based on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241928

The provision of local public goods in proportional representation electoral systems with closed and open party lists

Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl A.; Hankla, Charles R.; … - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700303

Love thy (elected) neighbor? : residential segregation, political representation and local public goods

Harjunen, Oskari; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Tukiainen, Janne - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433555

An analysis of tenure and turnover in the congressional labor market

Schansberg, David E. - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000883251

The two-party system in english political history

Trevelyan, George Macaulay - 1926

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000386828

The size and the scope of government : comparative politics with rational politicians

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido Enrico - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000167735

The third electoral system : 1853 - 1892; parties, voters, and political cultures

Kleppner, Paul - 1979

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000116365

Optimal gerrymandering : sometimes pack, but never crack

Friedman, John N; Holden, Richard T. - In: The American economic review 98 (2008) 1, pp. 113-144

Standard intuitions for optimal gerrymandering involve concentrating one's extreme opponents in "unwinnable" districts ("packing") and spreading one's supporters evenly over "winnable" districts ("cracking"). These intuitions come from models with either no uncertainty about voter preferences or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003740599