This paper examines bidding behavior in a setting where post-bid-letting project modifications occur. These modifications change both the costs and payouts to the winning contractor, making the contract incomplete. Recent empirical research shows that bidders incorporate the likelihood of such...

We investigate differences in bidding behavior and participation patterns between simultaneous and multi-round auction formats held in the state of Oklahoma. Theory suggests there could be differential bidding effects arising from synergies and the release of relevant information across the two...

There is substantial research supporting the "J-Curve" effect and contractionary effects on economies due to devaluation, especially for less developed countries (LDCs). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), however, have been promoting devaluation as a policy tool for...

This paper examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning...

This paper examines the spatial dependence among housing losses due to tornadoes using data from the May 1999 Oklahoma City tornado. In order to examine the existence of spatial dependence and its impacts on the damage analysis, we compare an estimation based on a traditional ordinary least...

We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning...

We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions. Moreover,...

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of...