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This note analyzes the efficiency properties of the equilibrium in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides a budget among collective and particularistic goods. We extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007) by considering smooth utility functions and consensus...
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This paper analyzes the incentives of the members of a committee to acquire skills, when they will share a fixed budget among them in ex-post negotiations. Skills are interpreted as the ability to manage a collective budget, in the sense that shares assigned to skilled agents generate positive...
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It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large benefits to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The work in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) shows that the large payoff differentials caused by structural holes can persist even when agents...
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We analyze a multi-issue bargaining model where the joint production of public goods is budget-constrained. The players must decide the part of the budget that is dedicated to produce any public good. We model the decision process as an alternating offer bargaining game with random proposers....
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