informed about her ability and her motivation. Firms differ both in their production technology and in the mission they pursue …. When the difference is not very high, then agent types sort themselves by motivation: the mission-oriented firm hires … worker is paid less by the mission-oriented firm. Such an earnings penalty is driven entirely by motivation, is increasing in …

productive ability nor the intrinsic motivation of the job applicant. We completely characterize the set of optimal contracts … according to whether motivation or ability is the main determinant of the worker's performance. We show that it is always in the …, when motivation is very high, incentives force the firm to pay higher informational rents, to increase effort distorsions …

high opportunity costs. Our findings are remarkably different when motivation is also taken into account. Welfare is not … than public-spirited motivation are attracted. Finally, we provide an overview of the labor market of politicians in Europe …

We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and their intrinsic motivation … adverse selection are mitigated. More interestingly, depending on the association between productivity and motivation, higher … two counterintuitive effects can only occur when a positive correlation exists between productivity and motivation. Our …

). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in …