With the increasing use of different types of auctions in market designing, modeling of participants’ behaviors to evaluate the market structure is one of the main discussions in the studies related to the deregulated power industries. In this article, we apply an approach of the optimal...

With the formation of the competitive electricity markets in the world, optimization of bidding strategies has become one of the main discussions in studies related to market designing. Market design is challenged by multiple objectives that need to be satisfied. The solution of those...

With the formation of the competitive electricity markets in the world, optimization of bidding strategies has become one of the main discussions in studies related to market designing. Market design is challenged by multiple objectives that need to be satisfied. The solution of those...

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies...

Agent-based simulations are performed to study adaptive learning in the context of asymmetric first-price auctions. Non-linearity of the Nash equilibrium strategies is used to investigate the effect of task complexity on adaptive learning by varying the degree of approximation the agents can...

This paper analyzes sequential auctioning of single units of an indivisible good to a fluctuating population composed of overlapping generations of unit-demand bidders. Two phenomena emergent in such a market are investigated: forward-looking bidding strategies, and closed-loop selling...