behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …

actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards …

higher rates of aggregate collusion in markets with fewer firms are driven by the changes in incentives or focality rather … than purely the number of firms. These findings imply that antitrust policies aimed at preventing collusion should focus on …

Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion … (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already …

-based social preferences suggest that negative externalities make collusion harder to sustain than predicted by standard economic …