The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic interaction is analysed. Whena pure labor managed duopoly is considered, firms choose their capital commitments according to the level of the interest rate, unlike what usually happens when only...

The behaviour of a multiproduct profit seeking monopolist is evaluated vis à vis that of a social planner, in a model where there is a continuum of consumers characterized by different marginal willingness to pay for quality. When the market is completely covered, the monopolist undersupplies...

The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers' marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so as to favour...

The paper focuses on trade between two countries where a vertically differentiated commodityis produced by a single firm in each country, operating initially in autarkic conditions. It is assumed that the two countries have overlapping income distributions, giving thus rise, under certain...

We model the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly. We extend the literature in determining the standard endogenously, showing that the maximisation of social welfare entails an increase in the surplus accruing to consumers served by the low quality...

The aim of this paper is to investigate a vertically differentiated market served either by a multiproduct monopolist or by duopolists, in which a public authority aiming at increasing the welfare level can choose among two instruments, namely, quality taxation/subsidization, and minimum quality...

This paper tackles the issue of choosing roles in differentiated duopoly games. First, it is shown that the leader is not necessarily better off than in the simultaneous equilibrium. Second, it is proved that the sequential equilibria obtain only if both firms are better off under sequential...

This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where governments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This...

The consequences of free trade are investigated in an international duopoly under horizontal differentiation and convex transportation costs. It is shown that the smaller country may benefit from trade if it is sufficiently small to allow for a significant volume of exports by the domestic firm....

Different market settings are considered in a free trade environment, where firms can choose technology, quality, and price or quantity. The shape of competition in prices requires the intervention of governments, via a common antidumping policy, to make firms converge on the simultaneous...