In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is verified in a setting with horizontal and vertical (green) differentiation. Profits are increasing in the mis- perception of quality, while the investment in green...

We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour, and we characterise the region wherein a Porter-type result takes place. We show that the Porter hypothesis applies in an equilibrium taking always the form of a prisoner's...

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly where production is polluting. We examine the alternative frameworks with quality-dependent fixed or variable costs, under both price and quantity competition. Under Bertrand behaviour, the...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>Contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalization causes an increase in foreign direct investment. We propose an explanation for this apparent puzzle by exploiting Dastidar's approach, which delivers a...</p>

We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duo- poly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore...

In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is verified in a setting with horizontal and vertical (green) differentiation. Profits are increasing in the misper- ception of quality, while, the investment in green...

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame, perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader’s...

The authors modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (Effect of Credible Quality Investment with Bertrand and Cournot Competition, 2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage....

We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour to show that firms may spontaneously adopt a green technology even in the complete absence of any form of regulation.

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard (MQS) in a vertically differentiated duopoly with an environmental externality. We establish that the MQS bites only if the hedonic component of consumer preferences is sufficiently strong. Then, we illustrate an underlying tradeoff...