This paper studies an industry in which firms can choose to provide open or closed platforms. Open platforms, as opposed to closed, are extendable so third-party producers can develop extensions for them. Building on a two-sided market model, I show that firms might prefer to commit to keeping...

We compare a discriminatory pricing regime with a non-discriminatory regime in a competitive bottleneck model where content providers endogenously sort into single or multi-homers. We find that consumer prices rise when the share of single-homers increases in the non-discriminatory case, while...

This paper investigates the effects of changes in retail market concentration when input prices are negotiated. Results are derived from a model of bilateral Nash-bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition. Whether...

This paper investigates the competition between vertically differentiated platforms in two-sided markets. We assume the presence of two competing platforms producing either higher- or lower-quality devices for consumers. Each platform decides the price of its hardware device for consumers and...

This paper studies competition between ad-sponsored platforms that strategically determine business models. In addition to basic services including annoying advertisements, each platform decides whether to introduce an ad-free premium service (i.e., a freemium business model). Freemium platforms...

We analyze a model of cost-reducing R&D and compatibility decisions by two platforms. After an exogenous improvement in the efficiency of R&D, each platform has a heightened incentive to make its software incompatible with the rival's hardware device to avoid being dominated in the hardware...

Recent revelations on the use of fiduciary services by the wealthy and political leaders raise concerns regarding the use of such services for tax and creditor evasion. Yet given the secrecy shrouding much of the fiduciary industry, we do not know which fiduciary services are used for such...

We study the optimal contract choice of an upstream monopolist producing an essential input that may sell to two vertically differentiated downstream firms. The upstream supplier can offer an exclusive contract to one of the firms or non-exclusive contracts to both firms. Each of the latter can...

Using two-part tariff under mutual outsourcing between symmetric downstream firms, we demonstrate endogenous choice of vertical structure with each exclusive channel. Recent market structure captures that the mutual outsourcing has become a common business practice in technology intensive...

Using decentralized Nash bargaining with two-part tariff under mutual outsourcing between symmetric downstream firms, we demonstrate endogenous choice of competition mode with each exclusive channel. Recent market structure captures that the mutual outsourcing has become a common business...