We consider a monopolistic screening model of patent licensing. There is one patentee and one licensee and the patentee wishes to sell a patent of cost reducing technology to the licensee. The patentee is an outsider and the licensee is the only firm in the product market. The licensee possesses...

This paper is the second of two companion pieces. In the first we developed a model of competition between payment systems which extends that of Chakravorti and Roson (2006). Here we turn to the results which can be obtained from the Chakravorti and Roson model, from our extension of it, and...

We take a broader perspective on the issue of recent price increases in the domestic rice market in Bangladesh. The query that follows is that: what exactly is the nature of competition at different stages of the domestic rice market of Bangladesh? This can be addressed only if we examine the...

This paper examines the issue of the first-mover and second-mover advantage in a vertical structure in which each manufacturer trades with a separated retailer via two-part tariffs. Compared to the canonical result in one-tier market, we find that the manufacturers' preference orderings over...

Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We explore the implications of weak enforcement of contractual commitments on the licensing conduct of firms and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it...

This paper analyzes the unilateral choices of application compatibility by platforms and the endogenous affiliations of two different groups (content providers and users). We find a novel result that for both platforms to unilaterally choose application compatibility is not an equilibrium unless...

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...

Intermittent power sources enable firms to reduce costs by horizontally subcontracting generation. Dispatchable units serve as a strategic device, even when never used, since their availability credibly limits the price paid for subcontracting. Security of supply measures motivated by too low...

We study a set of bilateral Nash bargaining problems between an upstream input supplier and several differentiated but competing retailers. If one bilateral bargain fails, the supplier can sell to the other retailers. We show that, in a disagreement, the other retailers' behavior has a dramatic...

This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower...