We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to...

We consider the problem of allocating the income of museum pass programs. Various properties of an allocation rule for such problems are introduced. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated tu-game...

TU games with two-level communication structure, in which a two-level communication structure relates fundamentally to the given coalition structure and consists of a communication graph on the collection of the a priori unions in the coalition structure, as well as a collection of communication...

The axiom of Balanced collective contributions is introduced as a collective variant of the axiom of Balanced contributions proposed by Myerson (1980). It requires that the identical average impact of the withdrawal of any agent from a game on the remaining population. It turns out that Balanced...

In this paper we consider cooperative graph games being TU-games in which players cooperate if they are connected in the communication graph. We focus our attention to the average tree solutions introduced by Herings, van der Laan and Talman [6] and Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang [7]....

We consider natural axioms for allocating the income of museum pass programs. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated TU-game introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TU-games. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set and that each TU-game has a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set. We characterize the collection of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets. We...

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to...

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest consistent set. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set. Moreover, the proof of this result points...