This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the...

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996a, 1999) in pure exchange economies. Firstly, assuming that there exists at least one partially...

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin''s theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo''s type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social...

The paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for the natural implementation of(efficient) social choice correspondences (SCCs) in pure finite exchange economies when some ofthe agents are partially honest. A partially honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to tellthe truth when...

The paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for the natural implementation of(efficient) social choice correspondences (SCCs) in pure finite exchange economies when some ofthe agents are partially honest. A partially honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to tellthe truth when...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin''s theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo''s type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social...