I study the process of bargaining over a pie of fixed size under the Nash demand game protocol. Motivated by the argument that the manner in which bargaining unfolds often depends on antecedents, I embed the bargaining process in a recurrent framework where individuals obtain random samples from...

At age 17, Adam Smith accepted a Snell Fellowship to Oxford, agreeing to be ordained as a minister of the Church of England. Smith did not fulfill this obligation. Instead, Oxford officials agreed to allow him to transfer from the Ordination to the civil law tract; and, later, to leave Oxford...

A profit-maximizing public good supplier endogenously determines the level of the public good and simultaneously negotiates with beneficiaries of the good one by one. A pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of...

As Posner (1997) has observed, when individuals in a relationship can commit to imposing costs upon each other then efficient behavior in the absence of law is possible. The question is whether efficient norms of behavior evolve endogenously in a population. We show that in a standard hold up...

Experimental studies of two-person sequential bargaining demonstrate that the concept of subgame perfection is not a reliable point predictor of actual behavior. Alternative explanations argue that 1) fairness influences outcomes and 2) that bargainer expectations matter and are likely not to be...

In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

The problem of ex ante choice between conflict situations is studied in an axiomatic model where individuals know the available surplus but are ignorant of the exact bargaining procedure. Furthermore, allowing for side-payments in a single good, a bargaining solution that is immune to ordinal...

I consider two new simple bargaining games in which two players bargain over division of a fixed amount of money. Both games are strategically equivalent to the dictator game, in that one player has the unilateral ability to determine the allocation. However, that player can instead choose to...

The present paper analyzes the dynamics of bargaining of the ultimatum game in presence of social differences amidst the participants. To that end, two parallel experiments were set-up. One where the social status states of the individuals were of common knowledge (alternative version) and...