We develop a unified treatment of a broad class of truthful disclosure games. Such games have, at most, one equilibrium that is reasonable given a commonly used signaling refinement. We provide a simple algorithm to construct the unique equilibrium strategy and beliefs, and identify necessary...

We examine whether managers convey more information via voluntary disclosure channels when standard-setters limit managers' discretion in GAAP. We estimate the extent to which standard setters limit managers' discretion by counting the number of times obligatory modal verbs are mentioned in the...

We employ a quasi-natural experiment to examine the effect of investor inattention on firms' voluntary disclosure. While prior research focuses on when managers make mandatory disclosures within a given quarter, we examine whether investor inattention influences what managers voluntarily...

Sophisticated financial market participants frequently choose to disclose private information to the public—a phenomenon inconsistent with most theories of speculative trading. In this paper, we propose and test a model to bridge this gap. We show that when a speculator cares about both the...

In this paper, I examine the impact of ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty), alongside that of risk, on firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions. I confirm the well-known result that an increase in risk— uncertainty over outcomes—is associated with an increase in management guidance (earnings...

Electoral legislation varies across countries and within countries over time, and across different types of elections in terms of how it allows publication of intermediate election results including turnout and candidates' vote shares during an election day. Using a pivotal costly voting model...