Most prior event studies find that the announcement of a new alliance is accompanied by a positive stock market response for the partners. This result has usually been interpreted as evidence for the prevailing view that alliances are effective vehicles for partners to acquire or access new...

A large theoretical literature on value capture following Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) uses cooperative games under complete information to study how and why firms earn supernormal profits. However, firms often have different information, beliefs, or creative foresight. We extend value...

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when the empirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behavior strategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behavior strategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization of empirical...

How does competition among economic actors determine the value that each is able to appropriate? We provide a formal, general framework within which this question can be posed and answered, and then provide several results. Chief among them is a condition that is both required for, and...

The broker profits by intermediating between two (or more) parties. Using a biform game, we examine whether such a position can confer a competitive advantage, as well as whether any such advantage could persist if actors formed relations strategically. Our analysis reveals that, if one...

This paper presents a formal theory of subjective rationality and demonstrates its application to corporate strategy. An agent is said to be subjectively rational when decisions are consistent with the available facts and, where these are lacking, with the agent's own subjective assessments. A...