We analyze a model where investors use a credit rating to decide whether to finance a firm. The rating quality depends on unobservable effort exerted by a credit rating agency (CRA). We study optimal compensation schemes for the CRA when a planner, the firm, or investors order the rating. Rating...

We find that large shareholders of Moody's (affiliated investors) abnormally decrease their stock ownerships in a firm before its downgrade by Moody's. This finding is stronger for informationally opaque stocks and active affiliated investors, significant only after Moody's initial public...

Using the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, we examine the credibility of mandatory disclosure by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on managerial learning from stock prices. We find an increase in investment-price sensitivity for firms affected by the Act. Consistent with managers relying...

The timeliness of the credit rating of a firm has been frequently called into question over the previous two decades. This paper examines whether changes in credit ratings can be updated more frequently than at the frequency of updates in the accounting data. The paper finds that, when market...

Do rating announcements reduce information asymmetries? We investigate the effect of rating disclosures on the volatility and liquidity of the US bond market. Although rating agencies' decisions often are anticipated by credit spread changes, we show that in the case of no regulatory change...