We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that under a wide range of conditions the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive...

This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a "punishment" effect in prices) from an...

We address the question of whether and how a sovereign should reduce its external indebtedness when default is a significant possibility, with a particular focus on whether a sovereign should buy back or dilute existing long-term sovereign bonds. Our main finding is that when reduction of debt...

Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? Using a two-generations game-theoretic model, we identify coordination and divide-and-conquer as key...

Since 2012 the Italian Government has taken several steps to repay its commercial debts. Using a composite dataset, we evaluate the effects of these policies on the financial performance of a representative sample of Italian firms. We distinguish between the firms that were beneficiaries of...

Deleveraging, whether via reductions in debt or increases in assets, is costly due to value transfers from shareholders to creditors. It is especially costly in the presence of long-term debt and when the need to deleverage is high. This paper, first, provides empirical evidence consistent with...