Similar Search Results

The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2016

This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457362

The single-peaked domain revisited : a simple global characterization

Puppe, Clemens - 2016

It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011558266

Minority vs. majority : an experimental study of standardized bids

Pintér, Agnes (contributor); Veszteg, Robert F. (contributor) - 2008

Due to its simplicity the plurality voting system is frequently used to choose a common representative or project. Nevertheless it may fail to provide a socially efficient decision as a majority can outvote any minority even if the majority’s gain does not compensate the loss suffered by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720837

The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452816

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth - 2011

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122583

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123565

A Simple Characterization of Borda Rule for Fixed Electorate

Sato, Norihisa - 2017

We consider axiomatic characterization of social choice functions when there exist a fixed number of voters. Our particular interest is in social choice functions that reflect, to some extent, positional information in voters' preference rankings as well as orders between two alternatives. More...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963037

Cardinal Voting : The Way to Escape the Social Choice Impossibility

Vasiljev, Sergei - 2008

In the article it is called the universality of the ordinal theory of social choice in question. It is shown that a … voting exists that cannot be described on the base of ordinal theory, and to describe it the cardinal point of view is … demanded. In absence of cardinal formalization of basic axioms of the social choice theory it is offered new formal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724685

Multiwinner Approval Voting : An Apportionment Approach

Brams, Steven J. - 2017

We extend approval voting so as to elect multiple candidates, who may be either individuals or members of a political party, in rough proportion to their approval in the electorate. We analyze two divisor methods of apportionment, first proposed by Jefferson and Webster, that iteratively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960207

Majority Rules in Constitutional Referendums

Cofone, Ignacio - 2018

The paper addresses the divergence in majority rules at the moment of creating or reforming constitutions. While constitutions require, in most cases, qualified majorities in order to be approved at the constitutional assembly, they normally require only simple majorities to be ratified at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937392