This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We … couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private … characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive …

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We … couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private … characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive …

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network … directed. They couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player …. The authors characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs …

communication structure in a mechanism and the ability of the principal to screen the agents not only on the basis of their … preferences over the outcomes, but also on the basis of their communication abilities. A number of interesting implications for …

other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two … multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non-monotonic. In particular …

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding … it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without …

) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …

quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide …