CEO flow incentives, both stock options and bonuses, are positively related to measures of firm market valuation and operating performance suggesting incentives are an important mechanism to align CEO interests with shareholders. These findings are robust to alternative measures of firm...

Using a matched sample of firms that do and do not undertake major investments we find that CEO incentives with option-based asymmetric payoffs greatly increase the likelihood that a firm will increase risk by undertaking both major real investments and acquisitions. In contrast, equity-based...

This study examines the effect of institutional investor influence on the structure of corporate boards. We focus on investor influences with respect to reducing board size and increasing board independence. Measures of institutional influence are negatively related to board size and positively...

Hartzell and Starks (2003) [HS] report that firms with more concentrated institutional investors pay executives less and make this pay more sensitive to performance. In an extended data set covering 1992 to 2010, we find that institutional concentration has no such effects when we control for...

Hartzell and Starks (2003) (HS) report that more concentrated institutional investing associates with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity and lower CEO pay. We find that institutional concentration has no effect on pay-for-performance sensitivity and increases compensation when we replicate...

Banking organizations in the United States have long been subject to two broad categories of regulatory standards. The first is permissive: a "positive" grant of rights and privileges, typically via a charter for a corporate entity, to engage in the business of banking