Drawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex-ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information...

We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesianpersuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise (a la Blackwell) is always harmful forthe information designer, i.e., the sender. We show that in general this is not the case. Weprovide a...

We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information...

A decision-maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision-maker, which is their private information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share...