This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second …-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the … other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in first-price auctions in simple case and second-price auctions are stable …

We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City … the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win …

ABSTRACT. Popular procurement auction formats vary along two main dimensions: (1) whether the winner is determined by … the lowest price or by the buyer, and (2) whether auctions are sealed bid or dynamic. The attractiveness of these formats …. This finding provides evidence that buyers should prefer sealed bid over dynamic auctions, especially if there is reason to …

We test recent theory on the benefits of auctions and bargaining as alternative procurement mechanisms using data on … the procurement of medical devices by Italian hospitals. Theory suggests that auctions perform well when cost control is … quality is difficult to verify. Consistent with the theory, we find that auctions are used more often when the influence of …

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of … ratio offered is selected as the winner of the auction. We model the decision process as based on a general noisy ranking of …

In this paper, we study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. A supplier's score is the difference …

for auctions when all (initial) bids fail to meet the reserve price, we identify collusion using ideas similar to …

We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a first-price public procurement … auction. In our model, firms are invited into the auction at positive costs, and a bureaucrat runs the auction on behalf of a … bureaucrat will invite more than socially optimal number of firms into the auction. Secondly, the effects of corruption on …