"Economists usually describe goods as being either (gross) complements or (gross) substitutes. Yet, what is less known is that one good may be a gross substitute for a second good, while the second good is a gross complement to the first good. This article develops a theory of asymmetric gross...

Benchmark two-good utility functions involving a good with zero income elasticity and unit income elasticity are familiar. In this paper we derive utility functions for the additional benchmark cases where one good has zero cross-price elasticity, unit own-price elasticity and zero own-price...

Horn's rule says that messages can be kept ambiguous if only a single interpretation is plausible. Speakers only perform costly disambiguation to convey surprising information. This paper shows that, while non-cooperative game theory cannot justify Horn's rule, evolutionary game theory can. In...

This paper develops a model of supplier-induced demand as strategic framing where the patient has reference-dependent references, and the physician can persuade the patient to buy a treatment by affecting the patient.s reference point. In the main result, the patient is assumed to have a...

We show that the intuition underlying the supplier-induced demand (SID) hypothesis is reflected in the cheap-talk literature from game theory, and in the credence-good literature from the economics of information. Applying these theories, we conclude that a neoclassical version of the SID...