Drawing inspiration from American institutionalism and new institutional economics, this paper discusses the rise of large corporate farms as the transition from the classic capitalist firm to the corporate form of organization based on the separation of ownership and control. Three case studies...

This survey provides an overview of theoretical and empirical research on information flows in corporations. It highlights key frictions preventing effective information flows and discusses how organizational structure and corporate governance can alleviate these frictions, focusing on three...

This survey provides an overview of theoretical and empirical research on information flows in corporations. It highlights key frictions preventing effective information flows and discusses how organizational structure and corporate governance can alleviate these frictions, focusing on three...

Focus - specialization and specific technology - improves productivity but leads to more dependency and opens a door for power problems. We analyze how organizational design and the choice of technology interact with the allocation of ownership in minimizing the holdup problem. We find a novel...

This article proposes a simple framework for understanding an emergent diversity of linkage between corporate governance (CG) and organizational architecture (OA). It distinguishes discreet modes of their linkage by different combinatorial patterns between three basic assets: managers' human...

Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the corporate sector in the US and in Europe. This paper examines the role of market competition for this trend in corporate reorganization. We find that at intermediate levels of competition the CEO of the corporation decides...

Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the corporate sector in the US and in Europe. This paper examines the role of market competition for this trend in corporate reorganization. We find that at intermediate levels of competition the CEO of the corporation decides...

This paper introduces the theory of firm organization under moral hazard into an equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous talents and technologies. The model is able to explain how the allocation of power and the provision of financial incentives inside firms varies within and...

A fundamental question for economics is why large firms in market economies usually assign control rights to capital suppliers rather than labor suppliers. A diverse collection of answers can be found in the literature. But unfortunately little theoretical consensus has emerged, and few attempts...

Japanese corporate governance reform is implemented by an introduction of corporate governance code and stewardship code, in which stewardship activities by institutional investors play an important role in terms of reduction of agency cost. In this report, stewardship activities are focused...