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Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582632

Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

Triossi, Matteo; Romero-Medina, Antonio - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2006

centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765471

Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - 2005

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322828

Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Klaus, Bettina - 2005

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and … Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272554

Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2007

The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094057

Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467863

On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism

Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu - 2012

This paper studies a general school choice problem with or without outside options. The Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications. We show that in problems where some students cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309612

Manipulationsanreize im Gale-Shapley-Algorithmus: Ein Literaturüberblick

Hüber, Frank - 2011

of Marriage (1962) led to a huge and still growing discussion in the literature on two-sided matching markets. The … twosided matching markets, e.g., within the marriage and college admissions problem. The incentives to manipulate are …Die von Gale und Shapley in ihrem 1962 veröffentlichten Artikel College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307662

Hochschulzulassungen in Deutschland: Wem hilft die Reform durch das "Dialogorientierte Serviceverfahren"?

Hüber, Frank; Kübler, Dorothea - 2011

decentralized matching markets such as multiple applications, late rejections of offers, and universities unable to fill all their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307743

An impossibility theorem in matching problems

Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209