I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching …

We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post …-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre … or SD matching are ex-post fair and efficient, they are not so ex-ante. Instead, the mechanism with pre-exam submission …

The paper analyzes the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets (college admission problems) under the …

Decisions agents make before and after matching can be strategically linked through the match. We demonstrate this … majors during their studies. The interaction between "matching forces'' (competition for higher quality students) and …

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often …

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …