We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching … correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. -- Matching with couples …

implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation …" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete …

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these … the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational … of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are …

. -- matching ; stable payoff ; competitive equilibrium payoff ; optimal stable payoff ; lattice …

Stability of Marriage" (1962) led to a huge and still growing discussion in the literature on two-sided matching markets. The … twosided matching markets, e.g., within the marriage and college admissions problem. The incentives to manipulate are …Die von Gale und Shapley in ihrem 1962 veröffentlichten Artikel "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage …

every fair matching is Pareto efficient. Based on the extended Pareto efficiency definition, the DA mechanism is the unique …

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …