We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary …

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and … Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts … stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable. -- Matching …

We study Nash implementation in many-to-one matching problems also known as college admission problems [Gale and … Shapley, College admission and the stability of marriage, Amer. Math. Monthly 69 (1962) 9-15]. In contrast to the previous … not equivalent to the marriage problem, J. Econ. Theory 36 (1985) 277-288] which rules out complementarities. We show that …

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or to remain single at the beginning of the first period. Individuals … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the …

We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply and … estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in male and … female wages. We estimate the expected share of marriage surplus appropriated by each spouse as a function of wages. The …

An important paper by Chiappori et al. (2012) has proposed an elegant and parsimonious model of spousal matching over …

An important paper by Chiappori et al. (2012) has proposed an elegant and parsimonious model of spousal matching over …