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The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586814

College admissions with entrance exams : centralized versus decentralized

Hafalir, Isa; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2018

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138431

Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz; Dur, Umut Mert - In: Social choice and welfare 55 (2020) 3, pp. 477-494

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012295579

Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems

Bérczi, Kristóf; Csáji, Gergely; Király, Tamás - In: Games and economic behavior 147 (2024), pp. 407-428

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135344

Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem

Holzman, Ron; Samet, Dov - In: Games and economic behavior 88 (2014), pp. 277-285

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011292573

The principal-agent matching market

Dam, Kaniska - 2003

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507906

Hiring Mechanisms, Application Costs and Stability

Triossi, Matteo - 2013

This note considers a hiring mechanism with multiple applications and application costs, which encompasses the common features of many real-world procedures. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. With zero application...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093529

Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

Jackson, Matthew O.; Palfrey, Thomas R. - EconWPA - 1997

bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, characterizing the possible allocation rules …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338

The Principal-Agent Matching Market

Dam, Kaniska; Pérez-Castrillo, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572268

Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities

Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée; Triossi, Matteo - 2019

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105711