We solve a buyback contract design problem for a supplier who is working with a retailer who possesses private information about the demand distribution. We model the retailer’s private information as a space of either discrete or continuous demand states so that only the retailer knows its...

This paper studies exchange economies in which agents have differential information about the goods that the other agents bring to the market. To study such a setting, it is useful to distinguish goods not only by their physical characteristics, but also by the agent that brings them to the...

The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement...

We consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good, such as endangered species. This paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about...

This paper provides a rationale for the use of convertible securities as the medium of exchange in corporate change-of-control transactions. We argue that convertible securities can resolve the information asymmetry about the bidder’s value while at the same time mitigating the information...

In this paper, we show that aggregate illiquidity is a priced risk factor on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). We develop the relationship between the illiquidity factor, asymmetric information, and market decline. Our empirical results show that while the illiquidity factor is a source of...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where agents, possibly asymetrically informed, face an "exogenous uncertainty", on the future state of nature, and an "endogenous uncertainty", on the future price in each random state. Namely, every agent forms private price anticipations on every...

In markets for experience or credence goods adverse selection can drive out higher quality products and services. This negative implication of asymmetric information about product quality for trading and welfare, poses the question of how such markets first originate. We consider a market in...

When banks and firms are connected through interpersonal linkages – such as their respective management having attended college or previously worked together – interest rates are markedly reduced, comparable with single shifts in credit ratings. These rate concessions do not appear to...

This paper contributes to the recent behavioral economics literature by showing that whether or not overconfidence changes qualitative predictions in asymmetric information markets may depend on the market structure itself. We first show that overconfidence may overturn fundamental relations...