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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592940
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003593107
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Teams versus individual accountability : solving multitask problems through job design
Corts, Kenneth S. - In: The Rand journal of economics 38 (2007) 2, pp. 467-479
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003616565
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Team governance : empowerment or hierarchical control
Friebel, Guido (contributor);  … - 2007
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We … show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members … identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578893
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Essays on the effects of information on incentives and on people's awareness and assessment of biases
Ludwig, Sandra - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003525391
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Opportunity counts : teams and the effectiveness of production incentives
Boning, Brent; Ichniowski, Casey; Shaw, Kathryn - In: Journal of labor economics 25 (2007) 4, pp. 613-650
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003564952
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Inefficient group organization as optimal adaption to dominant environments
Kolmar, Martin; Wagener, Andreas - 2010
Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008653415
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Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 2, pp. 312-328
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656732
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Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
Dur, Robert A. J.; Sol, Joeri - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 2, pp. 293-301
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656761
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Social norms and economic incentives in firms
Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2010
a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009154576