This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technology is...

The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of ambiguity on financial analyst forecast incentives and the associated abnormal stock returns. I present a model incorporating ambiguity aversion into a two-period Lucas tree model. The resulting model confirms the role of ambiguity in the...

A pre-condition for employer learning is that signals at labor market entry do not fully reveal graduates' productivity. I model various distinct sources of signal imperfection such as noise and multi-dimensional types and characterize their implications for the private return to skill...

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with financial market imperfections to study the effects of money on economic growth and to examine the role of informational imperfections in the determination of the equilibrium growth path. The findings are summarized as follows. First, economic...

In Irresolute Testators, Professor Jane Baron provocatively suggests the existence of two distinct types of testators: the rational, autonomous testator who has made deliberate choices about the contents of her will and whose errors, if any, are minor; and the more vulnerable, less resolute...

This Article explores the problems that arise when a will fails to dispose of an individual's entire estate, so that she dies partially testate and partially intestate. The questions then raised include (1) whether provisions contained in the will purporting to redefine the individual's...

This paper presents a simple framework for the analysis, valuation and simulation of several real options in the presence of shadow costs of incomplete information. Information costs can be viewed as sunk costs in the spirit of Merton's (1987) model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete...

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous...