Asheim et al. (2006, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.51, pp.93-109) show that participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) can be doubled in a two-region world by the Regional Penance strategy, designating countries that are permitted to punish...

This research aims to relax the condition in which international environmental agreements consists of asymmetric countries are sustained for a long-term, considering a repeated game model and the effect of ancillary benefits. We suppose all countries have the feature of two-sided asymmetry: the...

This paper examines the climate change treaties with cooperative R&D that brings about substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emission. By developing a joiner's gain function, we present a new approach under which countries that have invested in R&D can recover their R&D costs by breakthrough...

This study provides a new framework for international environmental agreements (IEAs) with full participation if each country has altruistic preference, using a repeated game. We assume that each country has two types of altruism: impartial altruism, where each country cares about other...

This paper aims at increasing the choice of regional agreements where developed and developing countries participate, by considering two strategies. We present a new strategy based on that of Asheim et al. (2006, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.51, pp.93-109), designating...