This study shows that asymmetry among countries can develop a stability of international environmental agreements, using a repeated game model. Our model reveals relaxed conditions for a weakly renegotiation-proof (WRP) equilibrium by selecting the punishment levels according to the types of...

Asheim et al. (2006, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.51, pp.93-109) show that participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) can be doubled in a two-region world by the Regional Penance strategy, designating countries that are permitted to punish...

This paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision bring significant benefits to countries with through a regional cooperation than a global cooperation. Using a repeated game model, this study shows that the regional cooperative approach is an appropriate way to...

This research aims to relax the condition in which international environmental agreements consists of asymmetric countries are sustained for a long-term, considering a repeated game model and the effect of ancillary benefits. We suppose all countries have the feature of two-sided asymmetry: the...