We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open...

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions.

Subjects played twice a multistage duopoly game with demand inertia. Their actual behavior is different from the unique subgame perfect equilibrium solution of the game. In the second plays of the game, subjects tend to behave more cooperatively than in the first plays: profits, prices, and...

We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish...