We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...

A central question in political science is how to best manage information asymmetries and commitment problems when disputes arise between states or nations. We argue that common framings of this problem miss an important feature: the institutions determining how disputes are resolved shape the...

The adoption of gender quotas in party lists has been a voluntary decision by many parties in many countries, and is now a subject of discussion in many others. The Parity Low passed in France in 2001 is particularly interesting because for the first time the quota was set at 50 percent, and the...

We evaluate how traditional parties may respond to populist parties on issues that are particularly fitting for populist messages. The testing ground is the 2020 Italian referendum on the reduction of members of Parliament. We implement a large-scale field experiment, with almost one million...

This paper evaluates the effects of statistical information on preferences for redistribution of scarce public resources. We refer to scarce resource with reference to the COVID-19 emergency: allocation of the first round of vaccine and the allocation of financial resources provided by the...

This paper evaluates the effects of statistical information on the propensity to favor a specific group of recipients when allocating a scarce public resource. We refer to scarce resource with reference to the COVID-19 emergency: allocation of the first round of vaccine and the allocation of...

When voters’ trust in politicians collapses, they demand simple policies that they can easily monitor. Disenchanted citizens therefore prefer committed delegates to politicians who propose themselves as competent policy makers but without a specific policy commitment (trustees). In a two-party...

We study the consequences of populism for government performance and the quality of bureaucracy. When voters lose trust in representative democracy, populists strategically supply unconditional policy commitments that are easier to monitor for voters. When in power, populists implement their...

We study whether a better knowledge of the functioning of pay-as-you-go pension systems and recent demographic trends in the hosting country affects natives' attitudes towards immigration. In two online experiments in Italy and Spain, we randomly treated participants with a video explaining how,...

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives to form parties before the elections. In this way...