This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market...

Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of...

Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates and otherrelated vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer totransfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodateentry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and thebreakdown of these...

Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of...

We consider exclusive contracts as a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer’s entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the...