We study the properties of the group-based model of voting in elections with more than two candidates. We consider two of the most widely used electoral rules around the world: plurality and majority runoff. We fully characterize the set of equilibria under both rules and identify the features...

We study the properties of the group-based model of voting in elections with more than two candidates. We consider two of the most widely used electoral rules around the world: plurality and majority runoff. We fully characterize the set of equilibria under both rules and identify the features...

Previous literature on contributory versus comparative negligence has shown that they reach equivalent equilibria. These results, however, depend upon a stylized application of the Hand Formula and an insufficiently coarse model of strategic incentives. Taking this into account, we identify a...

Theories of public reason hold that authoritative commands are justified if all who are subject to such commands have reason to accept them. Beyond this, public reason theories differ. Consensus public reason liberals hold that persons must have the same reason for endorsing the commands they...

In many areas where strategic communication models are applied (e.g., lobbying by interest groups), the relevant uncertainty about the sender is not over the direction of their bias, but their priority over different issues. Within a model of multidimensional cheap talk, if the salience of...

In real-life elections, voters do not have full information over the policy platforms proposed by political parties. Instead, they make their vote choice on the basis of (imprecise) subjective beliefs. I propose a new model of partisan competition to represent the interaction of these beliefs...